By Jerrold J Katz
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Recent Work on Radical Skepticism’, American Philosophical Quarterly 39, 215–57. — (2002d). ‘Resurrecting the Moorean Response to the Sceptic’, International Journal of Philosophical Studies 10, 283–307. — (2003). ‘McDowell on Reasons, Externalism and Scepticism’, European Journal of Philosophy 11, 273–94. — (2004). ) D. Suster, Rutgers University Press, Rutgers, New York. — (2005a). ) J. Keim-Campbell, M. O’Rourke & H. Silverstein, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts. — (2005b). Epistemic Luck, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
3. Note that for some, the contextualist’s peacemaking strategy seems concessive (Sosa 2000). For others, contextualism doesn’t get the semantics for knowledge attribution right (Hawthorne 2004 and MacFarlane 2005). 28 over in the skeptical paradox. First, (1) and (2) only imply not-(3) if some form of closure is true. Second, attempts to resolve the paradox by denying premise (2) run afoul of closure: denying (2), one claims that one can know M, the mundane proposition, while not knowing that not-S, the falsity of the skeptical proposition; but how is it possible for one to know one has all ten ﬁngers, while not knowing that one is not a (ﬁngerless) brain-in-a-vat?
For the sake of simplicity, however, we will focus on the formulation of the neo-Moorean view that employs safety here. 11. DeRose (1995) and Lewis (1996) are explicit in their endorsement of externalism. In contrast, Cohen tries to consistently maintain an internalist construal of the contextualist 11 porting epistemology in place — moreover, a supporting epistemology which, in outline at least, could not be objectionable by contextualist lights since it borrows its essentials from the contextualist account — we have the beginnings of a story of how one might legitimate the Moorean rejection of the sceptic’s ﬁrst premise over the sceptic’s endorsement of that premise, thereby evading the problem of second-order scepticism left us by the basic Moorean line.